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Refraining from reacting does not only involve reactive inhibitory mechanisms. It was
recently found that inhibitory control also relies strongly on proactive mechanisms. How-
ever, since most available studies have focused on reactive stopping, little is known about
how proactive inhibition of response is implemented. Two behavioral experiments were
conducted to identify the temporal dynamics of this executive function. They manipulated
respectively the time during which inhibitory control must be sustained until a stimulus
occurs, and the time limit allowed to set up inhibition before a stimulus occurs.The results
show that inhibitory control is not set up after but before instruction, and is not transient and
sporadic but sustained across time. Consistent with our previous neuroimaging ﬁndings,
these results suggest that proactive inhibition of response is the default mode of exec-
utive control. This implies that top-down control of sensorimotor reactivity would consist
of a temporary release (up to several seconds), when appropriate (when the environment
becomes predictable), of the default locking state.This conclusion is discussed with regard
to current anatomo-functional models of inhibitory control, and to methodological features
of studies of attention and sensorimotor control.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-control relies on the ability to countermand inappropriate
stimulus-driven response impulses. Several inhibitory mecha-
nisms may contribute to the process of refraining from reacting.
These are either phasic, reactive processes triggered by the exter-
nal stimulus itself, or tonic, proactive processes driven by top-
down control. While the former involve online control of ongo-
ing responses, the latter entail anticipatory locking of movement
triggering mechanisms.
Most available studies have focused on reactive stopping.
However, recent developments in the cognitive neuroscience of
inhibitory control have highlighted the probable role of proac-
tive mechanisms in inhibitory control (see Aron, 2011 for review).
Proactive inhibitory control of action might take various forms
such as adjusting the level of motor readiness, gating movement
triggering mechanisms non-selectively or, conversely, inhibiting a
particular response tendency. Importantly, proactive and reactive
mechanisms are probably not mutually exclusive but rather inter-
act for efﬁcient inhibitory control (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008;
Ballanger, 2009; Ballanger et al., 2009; Chikazoe et al., 2009; Lo
et al., 2009;Mazaheri et al., 2009; Boy et al., 2010c;Chen et al., 2010;
Claffey et al., 2010; Duque et al., 2010; Karayanidis et al., 2010,
2011; Ullsperger and King, 2010; Zandbelt and Vink, 2010). Nev-
ertheless, currentmodels of inhibitory control aremainly based on
studies that have investigated reactive mechanisms, and still very
little is known about the recent notion of proactive inhibitory
control.
The major obstacle for identifying proactive inhibitory control
(Figure 1) is that it is almost always involved in stimulus–response
paradigms (Jaffard et al., 2007). Indeed, when the experimental
protocol introduces uncertainty about the next event to come
(e.g., will it be a go or a nogo stimulus? a cue or a target? a
square or a circle?), as is usually the case in mixed-block designs,
subjects are forced towithhold automatic responses to any upcom-
ing event in order to avoid erroneous responses. This creates
a serious problem with respect to the meaning of the control
conditions or baseline activities classically used to refer to the
effects of interest. For example, the metabolic activity induced
by proactive inhibitory control does not survive standard neu-
roimaging contrasts like nogo> go or cue> no-cue trials because
the function is systematically involved in both conditions. Simi-
larly, the persistent neuronal activity observed before a stimulus
and pinpointing top-down inhibitory control in the absence of
sensory input vanishes when a short epoch preceding the ﬁrst
event of interest is used as a baseline for event-related potentials in
electroencephalographic or electrophysiological recordings. Thus,
identifying proactive inhibitory control requires the use of an
unbiased control condition performed in an independent block
of trials in which response triggering mechanisms are not locked
in advance (e.g., only go trials are presented apart from the other
conditions of interest and are compared to go trials presented ran-
domly in a mixed-design). Using appropriate control conditions
and baselines in order to take into account the effect of proactive
inhibitory control is central for the proper interpretation of the
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FIGURE 1 |The proactive inhibitory control model. (A) Hypothetical
dynamics of proactive inhibitory control. When there is uncertainty about
upcoming stimuli, as in standard mixed-block designs (e.g., go intermixed
with nogo trials in go/nogo protocols – Figure2A, cue intermixed with no-cue
trials in cue/target protocols – Figure 3), tonic response inhibition is required
to prevent false alarms (automatic responses to nogo or to cue stimuli). This
implies that inhibitory control cannot be lifted until the ﬁrst stimulus has been
identiﬁed (a go or a nogo, a cue or a target). As a consequence, proactive
inhibitory control is maximum at target occurrence in go and no-cue trials
(upper part), two conditions usually considered as regular control conditions in
standard designs. Accordingly, the mechanism of action of a warning signal
may simply consist in unbolting the gate before a target occurs (middle part).
Importantly, no proactive inhibitory control is required in conditions in which
only targets are presented (pure-blocks, lower part), providing an unbiased
baseline rarely considered in psychophysical setups. (B) Behavioral correlates
of proactive inhibitory control. Go trials in go/nogo protocols as well as no-cue
trials in cue/target protocols show a dramatic increase in reaction times (RT)
with respect to no-cue trials performed apart in pure-blocks. The former
condition involves proactive inhibition while the latter does not. The model
assumes that when a go signal is presented (or when a target occurs without
being preceded by a warning cue), the stimulus needs ﬁrst to be identiﬁed to
allow the release of inhibitory control and, hence, movement initiation. If a
warning cue is presented sufﬁciently in advance of the target (cue–target
onset asynchrony, CTOA ≥300ms), proactive inhibitory control has already
been released at target occurrence and fast automatic responses to
subsequent stimuli are generated in a similar way to no-cue trials performed
apart in pure-blocks. (adapted from Jaffard et al., 2007). Yet, it could be argued
that the RT change could be accounted for exclusively by (1) the addition of a
visual discrimination process to the task in mixed-blocks, and (2) a linear rise
to threshold model of motor preparation. Importantly, we previously tested
and rejected this hypothesis. First, visual discrimination is a prerequisite in
mixed designs, but ERP markers of inhibition are systematically locked to the
process (e.g., Boulinguez et al., 2009). Second, electrophysiological measures
of the activity of the muscles involved in response execution show that errors
do not linearly increase as CTOA increases, as predicted by motor preparation
effects. They are conversely composed of impulsive activations triggered by
the ﬁrst stimulus (Boulinguez et al., 2008; see also Sinclair and Hammond,
2008, 2009 for convincing evidence arising from studies using transcranial
magnetic stimulation during foreperiods of warned RT privileging the
inhibitory over the preparatory account). Finally, neuroimaging studies
revealed that brain activity preceding stimulus presentation is coupled with
changes in the motor brake circuitry (SMA, ventral anterior nucleus of the
thalamus, primary motor cortex, putamen and inferior parietal lobule: Jaffard
et al., 2007, 2008) and modulated by STN stimulation (Ballanger et al., 2009).
In other words, proactive inhibitory control likely involves the anticipated
suppression of the neuronal processes underlying movement initiation.
neural mechanisms underlying the numerous cognitive functions
usually tested with cue–target protocols (e.g., attention, decision
making, executive control). Otherwise, this may lead to reversed
interpretations of typical behavioral outcomes (Jaffard et al., 2007;
Albares et al., 2011) or brain activations (Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008;
Boulinguez et al., 2009). Taking into account the involvement
of proactive inhibitory control in stimulus response experiments
may help resolving long-lasting controversies about attention and
cognitive control (Kok et al., 2006; Anderson, 2011).
The proactive inhibitory control model hypothesizes that sub-
jects can switch from controlled inhibition of response (antici-
pated suppressionof theneuronal processes underlyingmovement
initiation) to automatic processing of sensorimotor information
(unlocked state) depending on their expectations of upcoming
events (see also Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010). Obviously, this con-
trol contributes to long-lasting task setting (the conﬁguration of
cognitive processes that is actively maintained for subsequent
performance in the task; Sakai, 2008; Vallesi et al., 2009), but
this switch can also be performed with short delays within the
course of a trial. Indeed, the time required to release proactive
inhibitory control was estimated at less than 300ms (Jaffard et al.,
2007; Figure 1). But how proactive inhibitory control can be
implemented remains elusive. It may be set up when the con-
text becomes ambiguous or potentially conﬂicting. According to
this view, executive control would consist of applying temporary
inhibition when necessary. Conversely, proactive inhibition may
be the default state of the executive system, meaning that top-
down control of sensorimotor reactivity would consist of releasing
temporarily proactive inhibitory control. The latter hypothesis is
compatible with recent functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) observations revealing large overlaps between the mysteri-
ous “Default Mode Network” of brain function and the structures
involved in the tonic inhibition state (Jaffard et al., 2008), yet no
direct behavioral support for this hypothesis is available.
Here we test these two hypotheses and assess the dynamics of
proactive inhibitory control by asking two questions: First, can this
control be sustained over long periods of time (several seconds)
or is it transient? Second, how long does it take to set up proactive
inhibitory control? Two behavioral experiments were conducted.
They manipulated the time during which inhibitory control must
be sustained until a stimulus occurs, and the time limit allowed to
set up inhibition before a stimulus occurs.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was adapted from classical go/nogo tasks. Subjects
were asked to react to a go stimulus by means of a button press
with the right thumb, and to withhold responses to an equiprob-
able nogo stimulus. Since we previously showed that proactive
inhibitory control is largely involved in this kind of task (Jaffard
et al., 2007), we also added a control condition in which it was not
involved, i.e., go trials performed apart for which there is no need
to refrain from reacting. In the go/nogo condition, we manipu-
lated the time during which proactive inhibitory control had to
be sustained by varying the delay between the beginning of a trial
and the go or nogo stimulus presentation (Figure 2A).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Nineteen naive subjects (ages: 23–38, 11 females) with normal
vision participated in the experiment. The experimental proto-
col was preapproved by the local ethical committee in Biomedical
Research (comité de protection des personnes sud-est IV,No. CPP
11/025). All participants gave written informed consent.
Apparatus and procedure
The subjects were seated in a darkened room in front of a screen
placed 50 cm from their eyes. Each subject’s head was ﬁxed using
a chinrest to maintain the viewing distance and stabilize the head.
Stimuli were presented and data were acquired using Presenta-
tion™. A red cross (0.4 cm× 0.4 cm) placed at the center of the
screen and set at the subject’s eye level served as a ﬁxation point.
Its appearance indicated the beginning of the trial and it lasted
until the end of the trial. It could be replaced by a go stimulus (a
2.5-cm∅ white circle centered on the screen, 2.9˚ of visual angle),
a nogo stimulus (a 2 cm× 2 cm white “X” centered on the screen,
2.3˚ of visual angle), or no stimulus at all (catch trials, 15% of
trials). Pre-stimulus delays (time between the beginning of a trial
and stimulus presentation, i.e., the time during which proactive
inhibitory control had to be sustained) varied from 2 to 6 s by
steps of 500ms. The inter-trial interval was ﬁxed to 1 s. Subjects
were asked to react as fast as possible to go stimuli by pressing a
button with the right thumb while maintaining their error rate
(responses in absence of go stimulus, responses to nogo stimuli
or missed go stimuli) below 10%. They were informed about the
evolution of their mean error rate after each error.
In order to introduce a control condition in which proactive
inhibitory controlwas not involved,we added another kindof trial:
a condition which did not require subjects to sustain proactive
inhibitory control after the trial start and during the course of the
pre-stimulus delay. In 35.7% of the trials, the central ﬁxation point
could turnwhite at the beginning of a trial, indicating that no nogo
stimulus would be presented (only go/control – “white_cross” tri-
als, 80% and catch trials, 20%). This condition enabled subjects
to react automatically to any upcoming event. After a training ses-
sion of 50 trials, “white_cross” and “red_cross” conditions were
presented randomly in mini-blocks of 20 trials. All in all, 36 trials
were presented for each condition of interest: Go/nogo (go pre-
sented in the red_cross condition, i.e., with stimulus uncertainty),
nogo (red_cross condition), and go/control (go presented in the
white_cross condition, i.e., without uncertainty about the identity
of the upcoming stimulus).
Data analysis
False alarm rate. Anine Pre-stimulus delay (2; 2.5; 3; 3.5; 4; 4.5; 5;
5.5; 6 s) ANOVA with repeated-measures was applied to the False
Alarm rate (number of responses to the nogo stimulus/number of
nogo stimuli).
Reaction time (the time between a go stimulus presentation and
the button press response). In order to avoid potential biases due
to the classical lengthening of RT distribution’s tail, we performed
the statistical analysis of RTon log transformeddata (neperian log-
arithm). A 2 Go (go/nogo vs. go/control)× 9 Pre-stimulus delay
(2; 2.5; 3; 3.5; 4; 4.5; 5; 5.5; 6 s) ANOVA with repeated-measures
was applied.Post hoc comparisonswere performedwhennecessary
using Newman–Keuls tests.
RESULTS
False alarms
No signiﬁcant effect was observed. The false alarm rate was low
for all values of pre-stimulus delay (mean 0.158± 0.026).
Reaction time
Reaction time (RT) results are presented in Figure 2B. A main
effect of Go [F(1, 18)= 131, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.88] showed shorter
RT to go stimuli in the go/control condition (RT: 293± 43ms)
than in the go/nogo condition (RT: 376± 61ms). A main effect of
Pre-stimulus delay was also observed [F(8, 144)= 10.5, p < 0.001;
η2 = 0.37]. Post hoc analyses revealed that RT decreased as a func-
tion of Pre-stimulus delay up to 3 s (376± 76 vs. 359± 66 vs.
341± 67 for 2, 2.5, and 3 s delays respectively, ps< 0.05). No
signiﬁcant difference was observed between Pre-stimulus delay
conditions above 3 s. No signiﬁcant interaction between go and
Pre-stimulus delay factors was observed.
DISCUSSION
The suppression of actions that are inappropriate in a given con-
text does not only rely on phasic, reactive inhibitory mechanisms
triggered by a nogo signal. Knowing that inhibitory control of
response may be required also involves anticipated adjustments.
Indeed, in accordance with the results of the present experiment,
the insertion of nogo signals in a series of trials delays response
latency in go trials with respect to an appropriate go/control condi-
tion (Menon et al., 2001; Jaffard et al., 2007).Unfortunately,proper
go/control conditions are not systematically or appropriately used
or discussed in go/nogo tasks, and the mechanisms by which
these anticipated modulations operate have long been ignored or
neglected. Some studies have attributed proactive modulations of
brain activity and related behavioral outcomes in inhibition tasks
to varying levels of sustained attention (Mazaheri et al., 2009)
or response readiness (van den Wildenberg et al., 2002). However,
recent converging evidence indicates that foreknowledge of poten-
tially conﬂicting upcoming events results in setting up a control
set whereby inhibitory control of response is applied in advance
(Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008; Boulinguez et al., 2008, 2009; Chikazoe
et al., 2009; Lo et al., 2009; Boy et al., 2010c; Chen et al., 2010;
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Overview of Experiment 1 (catch trials are not
represented). Subjects are instructed to react to the presentation of a go
signal (O) by pressing a button as fast as possible. At the beginning of a
trial, the central ﬁxation point (+) turns either red or white, indicating
respectively that nogo stimuli (X) can or cannot be presented. In the
former condition, subjects must refrain from reacting in order to avoid
responses to nogo stimuli. In the latter condition, subjects can react
automatically to any upcoming target. (B) Mean reaction time to go/nogo
(red line) and go/control (black line) stimuli plotted as a function of
pre-stimulus delay. Vertical bars indicate standard error of the means.
Claffey et al., 2010; Stuphorn et al., 2010; Aron, 2011). Obviously,
such an inhibitory state strongly affects performance in go/nogo
trials because proactive response inhibition is at a maximum at
stimulus occurrence, in contrast with go/control trials in which
no proactive inhibitory control applies since subjects do not need
to withhold responses to upcoming stimuli. Accordingly, it is likely
that the go/control vs. go/nogo RT difference is mostly due to the
involvement of proactive inhibitory control. More precisely, this
difference indexes the time required to release proactive inhibitory
control of response after the stimulus has been identiﬁed as the go
signal (Jaffard et al., 2007).
Based on this postulate, the results of Experiment 1 clearly sug-
gest that proactive inhibitory control is not transient but can be
sustained over several seconds (at least 6) since the go/control vs.
go/nogo RT difference remains constant over increasing forepe-
riods (83ms, Figure 2B). In particular, this main effect does not
interact with the effect of foreperiod duration classically observed
onRTwhen thedistributionof pre-stimulus delays is uniform(Los
and Van Den Heuvel, 2001). The observation that RT decreases as
pre-stimulus delay increases (observed only from 2 to 3 s pre-
stimulus delays in the present experiment) is usually attributed
to the fact that non-speciﬁc preparation develops in accordance
with the conditional probability of stimulus occurrence (the more
time elapses, the greater the chance that a target will occur). Since
this outcome is identical for the go/control and go/nogo condi-
tions in our experiment, it can be asserted that proactive inhibitory
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control is not confoundedwithmotor preparation. In otherwords,
this observation supports the view that proactive inhibitory con-
trol of response does not only rely on the modulation of motor
corticospinal excitability, but also involves independent breaking
circuits acting on the command function for initiating a motor
program (Jaffard et al., 2008).
While we now know that proactive inhibitory control can be
sustained for relatively long periods of time (present data) and
can be released when appropriate within extremely short delays
(<300ms, e.g., Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008; Boulinguez et al., 2009),
a major issue remains regarding its dynamics: how is proac-
tive inhibitory control implemented? Theoretically, two opposite
hypotheses can be put forward: (1) Proactive inhibitory control
is set up as soon as there is uncertainty about upcoming events,
and is sustained until this uncertainty vanishes (the temporary
set hypothesis). (2) Proactive inhibitory control is the default
state of executive control, and can be actively released when an
upcoming event becomes predictable (the default state hypothe-
sis). These two hypothesesmake speciﬁc predictions that are tested
in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 (Figure 3) was adapted from the standard warned
visual detection task. The original task allows the dynamics
of proactive inhibitory control to be revealed because it sepa-
rates in time the implementation of proactive inhibitory control,
its release, and target presentation (Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008;
Boulinguez et al., 2008, 2009), while the last two events occur
simultaneously in go/nogo-like protocols. It was adapted in the
sense that we used instruction signals as in Experiment 1 to inform
subjects about the experimental condition (red and white crosses),
rather than performing these conditions in two separate blocks of
trials. Subjectswere asked to react to a target,whichmight ormight
not be preceded by a warning cue, by means of a button press with
the right thumb. In otherwords, theywere implicitly asked towith-
hold responses to unpredictable cues. We manipulated the time
limit to set up proactive inhibitory control by varying the delay
between the beginning of a trial (instruction) and the stimulus
presentation (cue or target, Figure 3). We focused on the period
0–2 s after the trial started, which was ignored in Experiment 1.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-ﬁve naive subjects (ages: 21–28, 17 females) with normal
vision participated in the experiment. The experimental proto-
col was preapproved by the local ethical committee in Biomedical
Research (comité de protection des personnes sud-est IV,No. CPP
11/025). All participants gave written informed consent.
FIGURE 3 | Overview of Experiment 2. Subjects are instructed to react to
the presentation of the target (X) by pressing a button as fast as possible. At
the beginning of a trial, the central ﬁxation point (+) turns either red or white,
indicating respectively that a warning cue (two peripheral squares) can or
cannot be presented before target occurrence. In the former condition,
subjects must refrain from reacting in order to avoid responses to the warning
cue. In the latter condition, subjects can react automatically to any upcoming
target.
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Apparatus and procedure
While keeping their gaze ﬁxed on a central ﬁxation point (a
0.4 cm× 0.4 cm cross at the center of the screen), the subjects were
asked to react as quickly as possible to a visual target that might
or might not be preceded by a neutral warning signal. The neutral
cue was composed of two 1.8 cm× 1.8 cm squares (2.06˚ of visual
angle) located 6.9˚ to the left and right of the ﬁxation point (dura-
tion 50ms). The target was a 0.6 cm× 0.5 cm “X” (0.69× 0.57˚ of
visual angle) located either at 6.9˚ to the left or right of the ﬁxation
point (duration 50ms).
As in Experiment 1, the central ﬁxation point could be red or
white when displayed at the beginning of a trial. A red cross indi-
cated that a target could be preceded by a neutral warning signal
(75%) or not (25%). A white cross indicated that no warning sig-
nal would be presented before a target (100% targets). In other
words, this control condition did not require subjects to sustain
proactive inhibitory control during the course of the pre-stimulus
delay. We manipulated the time allowed to implement proactive
inhibitory control by varying the delay between the beginning
of a trial (instruction) and stimulus presentation (cue or tar-
get; Figure 3). Pre-stimulus delays varied randomly from 250 to
2000ms in steps of 250ms.
We also manipulated cue–target onset asynchrony (CTOA).
Based on previous ﬁndings showing that the release of inhibitory
control triggered by cue presentation takes less than 300ms
(Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008; Boulinguez et al., 2008, 2009), we
used three CTOA levels that surround this value (100, 300, and
500ms). Short CTOA (100ms) is classically characterized by
long RT because proactive inhibitory control is still engaged at
target occurrence, whereas long CTOA (300, 500ms) is char-
acterized by short RT because proactive inhibitory control has
already been released at target occurrence. Importantly, RT val-
ues for long CTOA were always found to be identical to RT
observed in a control condition in which only targets were
presented and for which no proactive inhibitory control was
required (Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008; Boulinguez et al., 2008,
2009). In other words, long CTOA also provide a reliable control
condition.
After a training session of 50 trials, “white_cross” and
“red_cross”conditionswere presented randomly in 10mini-blocks
of 40 trials. All in all, 240 cue trials (80 for each CTOA condition),
plus 80 red_cross_no_cue trials, plus 80 white_cross_no_cue tri-
als were presented. For each one of these conditions, 10 trials were
presented for each pre-stimulus delay.
Data analysis
False alarms. False alarms were deﬁned as responses to the cue.
There are easily detectable when the button press occurs before
the target. However, there are less easy to detect when the delay
between the cue and the target is short. In order to detect responses
to cues given after the target was presented for short CTOA tri-
als, we also applied a cut-off ﬁlter to RT <150ms. These very
short RT, outside the regular distribution, were considered as false
alarms in cue target trials. An eight Pre-stimulus delay (250; 500;
750; 1000; 1250; 1500; 1750; 2000ms) ANOVA was applied to
False Alarm rate (number of responses to the cue/number of cue
trials).
Pre-processing of RT data. We ﬁrst analyzed cue trials RT
according to CTOA and Pre-stimulus delay. The goal of this pre-
processing is to check that CTOA ≥300ms are long enough to
allow subjects to release proactive inhibition, i.e., to insure that
it is correct to consider long CTOA as a proper control con-
dition. According to the model of proactive inhibitory control,
this statement implies that longer RTs are observed for short
(100ms) than for long (≥300ms) CTOA, and that RT stabilizes
after CTOA 300ms. A three CTOA (100, 300, 500ms) ANOVA
conﬁrmed that long CTOA (500 and 300ms) provides shorter RT
than short CTOA (100ms; respectively 252 and 254 vs. 307ms;
F(2, 48)= 147; p < 0.001, ps < 0.001 for post hoc Newman–Keuls
tests). Individual analyses (t -tests) revealed that this effect was sig-
niﬁcant for each of our 25 subjects. Since no signiﬁcant difference
was observed between CTOA 500 and CTOA 300, we collapsed
these two conditions, referred to as “long_CTOA” in the following
sections, for the main data analyses.
Reaction time. Since switching from controlled inhibition to
automatic sensorimotor reactivity may involve great interindivid-
ual variability with regard to switch timing (in addition to basic RT
interindividual variability), we performed individual analyses to
categorize each subject’s behavior with respect to the speciﬁc pre-
dictions of our two hypotheses. Unpaired two-sample t -tests were
used to compare theRTs of cue andno-cue conditions for eachpre-
stimulus delay. More precisely, we compared “red_cross_no_cue,”
“white_cross_no_cue,” and “red_cross_long_CTOA” conditions.
The false alarm rate (number of responses to cues/number of cues,
all CTOA collapsed) for each pre-stimulus delay was assessed by
means of unpaired two-sample t -tests.
RATIONALE
Figure 4 presents the speciﬁc predictions of the two opposite
hypotheses.
If proactive inhibitory control is set up when uncertainty about
upcoming events occurs (temporary set hypothesis), then, in our
experimental design, set up is induced by the presentation of the
red cross.According to this hypothesis (Figure 4, left side), the time
required to implement proactive inhibitory control can easily be
estimated on the basis of the analysis of cued trials performance
(green lines). Indeed, when the cue appears before set up is com-
pleted, the false alarm rate (responses to cues) is expected to be
maximum (with minimum RT to cues). When the cue appears
after set up is completed, no false alarm is expected. This hypothe-
sis suggests that the switch time from maximum to minimum false
alarm rate reﬂects the time required to set up inhibitory control.
No-cue trials in the uncertainty condition (red_cross, blue lines)
provide speciﬁc predictions about the duration of this mecha-
nism. Indeed, if the target appears within short delays, very short
RTs are expected because proactive inhibitory control is not set
yet. Conversely, if the target appears after a sufﬁcient delay, long
RTs are expected because inhibition is ON at target occurrence.
The switch time from minimum to maximum RT is also supposed
to index the time required to set up inhibitory control. Finally,
no-cue trials in the control condition (white_cross, i.e., no need to
set up proactive inhibitory control; black lines) predict short RT
whatever the pre-stimulus delay.
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FIGURE 4 | Respective predictions of the temporary set and default state
hypotheses of proactive inhibitory control. (A)The progress bars convey
the state (ON or OFF) of proactive inhibitory control presupposed by each
model at each moment in time, starting from the beginning of a trial, for each
experimental condition. (B) Predictions regarding the evolution of both false
alarms rate and RT according to pre-stimulus delay are presented (blue line:
red_cross_no_cue; green line: red_cross_long_CTOA; black line:
white_cross_no_cue). See text for details (see “Rationale”).
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The default state hypothesis makes opposite predictions. If
proactive inhibitory control is the default state of executive con-
trol, this means it is already set at the trial start and must just be
released after any event (white cross or warning cue) indicates that
there is no more uncertainty about the identity of the next stim-
ulus. According to this hypothesis (Figure 4, right side), the time
required to release default inhibitory control can be estimated on
the basis of the analysis of no-cue trials in the control condition
(white_cross, i.e., no need to sustain proactive inhibitory control;
black lines). Indeed, if the target appears too soon after instruc-
tion presentation, i.e., while inhibitory control is still ON, then
long RTs are expected. Conversely, if the target is presented after
a sufﬁcient delay, i.e., after inhibitory control has been released,
short RTs are expected. This hypothesis suggests that the switch
time from long to short RT reﬂects the time required to release the
default state of inhibitory control. Since this control is already ON
at the trial start, this hypothesis also predicts that the rate of false
alarms will remain low whatever the duration of the pre-stimulus
period for cued trials (green lines), as well as RT to targets with
long CTOA. Finally, no-cue trials in the red_cross condition (blue
lines) are expected to provide long RTs whatever the pre-stimulus
delay because inhibitory control is always supposed to be ON at
target occurrence.
To test these predictions, we performed individual sta-
tistical analyses. We ﬁrst contrasted red_cross_no_cue with
white_cross_no_cue conditions, assuming that inhibition is ON
in the red_cross_no_cue condition when a signiﬁcant differ-
ence is observed. If inhibition is ON in both conditions, no
signiﬁcant difference but long RT are expected. If inhibition
is OFF in both conditions, no signiﬁcant difference but short
RT are expected. Then we contrasted white_cross_no_cue with
red_cross_long_CTOAconditions, assuming that inhibition isON
in the white_cross_no_cue condition when a signiﬁcant difference
is observed, and OFF when there is no signiﬁcant difference (see
Figure 4; Table 1).
RESULTS
False alarms
No signiﬁcant effect was observed. The false alarm rate was low
for all values of pre-stimulus delay (mean 0.037± 0.004).
Reaction time
Individual results are presented in Table 1 and Figure 5. Twenty-
two of the 25 subjects showed similar patterns consistent with the
predictions of Hypothesis #2 (Figure 4).
Thus, we calculated a normalized RT in order to better
illustrate the switch of the white_cross_no_cue condition from
one control condition (inhibition ON) to the other (inhibi-
tion OFF) as pre-stimulus delay elapses (Figures 4 and 5A).
White_cross_no_cue (black line) data were transformed with
respect to statistical comparisons with red_cross_no_cue (blue
line) and red_cross_long_CTOA (green line) control conditions
for each pre-stimulus delay. When white_cross_no_cue is not
different from red_cross_no_cue, RT is maximum. Accordingly,
it was inferred that inhibition is ON at target occurrence and
the value 1 was attributed to normalized white_cross_no_cue
RT. Conversely, when white_cross_no_cue is not different from
red_cross_long_CTOA, RT is minimum. Thus, it was inferred
that inhibition was OFF at target occurrence and the value 0 was
attributed to normalized white_cross_no_cue RT. When signiﬁ-
cant differences were reported, corresponding normalized values
were calculated as follows:
Normalized RT
= [(red_cross_no_cue) − (red_cross_long_CTOA)][(white_cross_no_cue) − (red_cross_long_CTOA)]
Normalized RT data were then ﬁtted by a logistic function
(Figure 5A, right) which best represents the switch from one state
to the other. A Chi-square was used to test the validity of this ﬁt.
Observed and theoretical distributions were not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent for any of the 22 subjects who showed patterns consistent
with the predictions of Hypothesis #2 (ps> 0.97; Table 1).
The time required to start releasing inhibitory control after a
trial start in the white_cross_no_cue condition can be estimated
as the time the ﬁtted logistic function reports values <1. The time
inhibitory control is fully released in the white_cross_no_cue con-
dition can be estimated as the time the ﬁtted logistic function
reaches 0. The difference between these two events represents
the mean duration of the process in charge of releasing proac-
tive inhibitory control after the uncertainty about the nature of
the upcoming event has vanished. Figure 5B shows that the tim-
ing of these events is variable across subjects (mean duration:
600± 664ms).
Among the three remaining subjects, two (s8, s12)
showed no difference between the red_cross_no_cue and
white_cross_no_cue conditions. The other subject (s19) showed
signiﬁcant differences between the red_cross_no_cue and
white_cross_no_cue conditions beginning 1750ms after trial start.
However, RT in the white_cross_no_cue condition remained
longer than in the red_cross_long_CTOA control condition for
all pre-stimulus delays. These two patterns do not ﬁt all predic-
tions of Hypothesis #2, but are in total contradiction with the
predictions of Hypothesis #1.
DISCUSSION
Eighty-eight percent of the subjects revealed clear patterns of
results ﬁtting perfectly the predictions of the default state hypoth-
esis (Figures 4 and 5A,B). Among the other subjects, two did not
take into account the instruction to react freely to upcoming events
(white_cross condition), or were unable to release inhibitory con-
trol in due time after trial start. Nevertheless, inhibitory control
was also already set at trial start for these subjects, who were able
to release it after the presentation of a warning cue in less than
300ms like the other subjects. The other atypical subject seemed
able to follow the instruction to release inhibitory control after
the trial start (white_cross condition). However, his RT pattern
suggests that this mechanism remained uncompleted 2 s after the
trial start.
All together, these results suggest that (1) proactive inhibitory
control is the default state of executive control because it is already
set at the trial start for all subjects, (2) the dynamics of proac-
tive inhibitory control of response is variable among subjects and
is heterogeneous depending on the instructing stimulus: While
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Table 1 | Individual RT analyses of Experiment 2.
Subject Test Pre-stimulus delay (ms) Logistic fn fit
250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 Chi-square (p)
s1 #1 - (380) * * * * * * *
#2 * * - (232) - - - - -
Norm. 1 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s2 #1 - - (457) * * * * * *
#2 * * - (276) - - - - -
Norm. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s3 #1 - (477) - - * * * * *
#2 * - - - (249) - - - -
Norm. 1 0.54 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 1
s4 #1 - (431) * - * - * * *
#2 * * - - - - (268) - -
Norm. 1 0.41 0.43 0 0.47 0 0 0 0.97
s5 #1 - (403) - - * - - * *
#2 - - - - - - - (300) -
Norm. 0.55 −0.55 0.59 0 0.24 0.25 0 0 0.99
s6 #1 - (396) * * * * * * *
#2 * * - (274) - - - - -
Norm. 1 0.39 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s7 #1 - - - - -(301) - - *
#2 * * * * * - - -(235)
Norm. 1 1 1 1 1 0.34 0.44 0 0.99
s8 #1 - - - - - -(299) * *
#2 * * * * * * * *(239)
Norm. 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.63 1.1 -
s9 #1 - -(325) - - * * * *
#2 * * - - -(215) - - -
Norm. 1 1 0.36 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.99
s10 #1 - -(340) * * * * * *
#2 * * -(236) - - - - -
Norm. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s11 #1 - -(351) * * * * * *
#2 * * * -(237) - - - -
Norm. 1 1 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 1
s12 #1 - (450) - - - - - - -
#2 * (297) * * * * * * *
Norm. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -
s13 #1 *(504) * * * * * * *
#2 * -(242) - - - - - -
Norm. 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s14 #1 -(405) * * * * * * *
#2 * -(243) - - - - - -
Norm. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s15 #1 - (372) * * * * * * *
#2 - -(247) - - - - - -
Norm. 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s16 #1 -(414) - - * * * * *
#2 * - - -(234) - - - -
Norm. 1 0.46 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0.99
s17 #1 -(347) * * * * * * *
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Subject Test Pre-stimulus delay (ms) Logistic fn fit
250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 Chi-square (p)
#2 - -(248) - - - - - -
Norm. 0.62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s18 #1 - -(351) - - - * * *
#2 * * - - - -(222) - -
Norm. 1 1 0.48 0.26 0.30 0 0 0 0.99
s19 #1 - (352) - - - - - - -
#2 * * * * * * - -(242)
Norm. 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.42 0.28 -
s20 #1 - -(455) * * * * * *
#2 * * -(253) - - - - -
Norm. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s21 #1 -(462) - * * * * * *
#2 * - -(332) - - - - -
Norm. 1 0.82 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s22 #1 - -(408) * * * * * *
#2 * * -(268) - - - - -
Norm. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s23 #1 - -(467) - * * * * *
#2 * * - -(279) - - - -
Norm. 1 1 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 1
s24 #1 - - -(286) * * * * *
#2 * * * * * -(230) - -
Norm. 1 1 1 0.058 0.27 0 0 0 0.99
s25 #1 - - - -(347) - - * *
#2 * * * * - - -(244) -
Norm. 1 1 1 1 0.19 0.33 0 0 0.99
Unpaired two-sample t-tests were used to compare red_cross_no_cue with white_cross_no_cue conditions (comparison #1) and white_cross_no_cue with
red_cross_long_CTOA conditions (comparison #2) for each pre-stimulus delay (-, no signiﬁcant difference; *p<0.0031 – corrected for multiple comparisons). Normal-
ized white_cross_no_cue RT (Norm.) is reported for each condition (see text and Figure 5 for details). The value 1 indicates that inhibition is ON at target occurrence.
The value 0 indicates that inhibition is OFF at target occurrence. Mean red_cross_no_cue RT (underlined) is given for the last condition of pre-stimulus delay for which
inhibitory control is still ON at target occurrence. Mean red_cross_long_CTOA RT (bold) is given for the ﬁrst condition of pre-stimulus delay for which inhibitory control
signiﬁcantly reaches the OFF state. The p-values obtained when testing the validity of the logistic function ﬁt (Chi-square) are reported in the last column.
an exogenous alerting cue allows a rapid (<300ms) release of
inhibitory control for all subjects, a symbolic instruction cue
induces a longer and more variable switch to an automatic mode
of sensorimotor processing (≥500ms).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Proactive control may better account for efﬁcient inhibition of
inappropriate responses than reactive control (Aron, 2011). How-
ever, the mechanisms involved in the preparation to inhibit motor
responses are still unclear. Brain activations (or deactivations)
observed in the pre-stimulus period in tasks requiring subjects to
refrain from reacting have been variously attributed to sustained
attention (Coull et al., 1996; Coull, 1998; Mazaheri et al., 2009,
2011),motor corticospinal excitability reduction (Duque and Ivry,
2009; Sinclair and Hammond, 2009; Stinear et al., 2009), response
threshold (Forstmann et al., 2008; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008),
or increase in working memory load (Coull et al., 1996; McNab
et al., 2008). Without refuting the direct or indirect roles these
functions play in controlling motor outputs, we assume, based on
recent ﬁndings, that the main neurocognitive mechanism involved
in proactive inhibitory control is an active braking process that
locks movement initiation processes in anticipation of stimulus
occurrence (Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008 summarized in Figure 1; see
also Brass and Haggard, 2007; Jahfari et al., 2009). However, how
this control is set up is still unknown.
What is accepted is the fact that proactive inhibition is con-
trolled according to the goals of the subject (Aron, 2011). The
standard view implicitly suggests that this control is set up when
the context becomes ambiguous or potentially conﬂicting. In other
words, executive control would consist of generating a top-down
signal to gate the neural mechanisms responsible for movement
triggering as long as uncertainty remains. The results of the present
experiment clearly contradict this view. Proactive inhibition of
response is probably the default state of executive control. This
means that applying control would conversely consist of gen-
erating a top-down signal that unlocks the neural mechanisms
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FIGURE 5 | Results of Experiment 2. (A) RT for a typical subject (left
side). White_cross_no_cue RT normalized according to both
red_cross_no_cue and red_cross_long_CTOA conditions for the same
subject (right side). Data are ﬁtted by a logistic function which best
represents the switch from one state to another. (B) Fitted logistic
functions for the 22 of 25 subjects whose data ﬁt the predictions of the
default state hypothesis of proactive inhibitory control. (C) RT for the
three of the 25 subjects whose data did not match entirely the
predictions of the default state hypothesis of proactive inhibitory control.
Vertical bars indicate SE.
responsible for movement triggering as soon as uncertainty about
the next event had vanished. This release is not transient and prob-
ably does not act like a burst locked to the motor response, but
can be sustained for several seconds. At ﬁrst glance this mecha-
nism seems counter-intuitive, but it is probably the most effective
means of regulating voluntary vs. automatic modes of action con-
trol. While the ability to allow or to override automatic motor
activations is a core feature of ﬂexible and adaptive behavior, in
everyday life, most of the time we must refrain from reacting to
stimuli overﬂows. Indeed, all kinds of sensory stimulation may
provide important sources of motor excitation that can trigger
undesiredmovements (Endo et al., 1999; Tipper, 2001;Aron, 2007;
Minelli et al., 2007; Boulinguez et al., 2008; Mele et al., 2008; Sum-
ner and Husain, 2008). Only occasionally do we decide that acting
or reacting may be appropriate. Accordingly, setting-up proactive
inhibitory control each time the environment becomes potentially
stimulating would be particularly inefﬁcient, especially when the
context is poorly predictable. In addition, from an ecological point
of view, efﬁcient control with reduced energy costs assumes that
executive control consists of occasionally releasing, for short and
appropriate periods of time, the default, effortless, mode of con-
trol that locks the neural mechanisms responsible for movement
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initiation. This mechanism is reminiscent of the neuroethologi-
cal model of tonic inhibition/disinhibition that accounts for the
control of motor programs both in vertebrate and invertebrate
animals (Benjamin et al., 2010).
Obviously, the functional anatomy of this top-down control
is still a hot matter of debate. Improving psychological models
of proactive inhibitory control is required to feed future neu-
roimaging studies and contribute to a better understanding of the
neural systems supporting this executive function. For instance,
the knowledge that proactive inhibitory control is probably the
default state of the executive system and that the top-down signal
of interest may be locked to the “releasing” period should inspire
future experimental settings aiming at distinguishing executive
from attentional and sensorimotor processes (Jaffard et al., 2007,
2008). So far, it seems that proactive and reactive inhibition may
engage partially overlapping brain networks, including especially
the presupplementary motor area (preSMA), the right inferior
frontal cortex, the subthalamic nucleus (STN), and the striatum
(Vink et al., 2005;Ballanger et al., 2009; Jahfari et al., 2009;Zandbelt
and Vink, 2010; Aron, 2011) as well as the supplementary motor
area and the inferior parietal cortex (Menon et al., 2001; Rubia
et al., 2001; Jaffard et al., 2008; Boy et al., 2010a,b; Chen et al.,
2010; Swick et al., 2011; Wardak, 2011) with downstream effects
onM1 excitability (Duque and Ivry, 2009; Sinclair andHammond,
2009; Stinear et al., 2009; Claffey et al., 2010). In other words, the
stopping network would be preactivated by preparing to inhibit
(Aron, 2011). However, while highly probable, this provisional
conclusion must be considered carefully because the respective
effects of proactive and reactive mechanisms are difﬁcult to disen-
tangle one from the other with standard metabolic brain imaging
methods (Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008; Boulinguez et al., 2008, 2009),
and also because the physiological correlates of inhibition remain
ambiguous (Lauritzen, 2001; Aron, 2007; Buzsáki et al., 2007). In
addition, even when brain activity preceding stimulus processing
is carefully isolated, it remains difﬁcult to sort out proactive inhi-
bition of response initiation from other functions involved in
cognitive control like error monitoring (Rushworth and Taylor,
2007; Eichele et al., 2008) and task setting (Vallesi et al., 2009).
The conclusions of Experiment 2 are particularly reminiscent of
our previous fMRI investigations suggesting that inhibitory con-
trol may be one of the functions of the “default mode of brain
function” (Jaffard et al., 2007, 2008). Indeed, the mPFC (together
with the precuneus/posterior cingulate and inferior parietal cor-
tex also identiﬁed in the above mentioned studies, see Hagmann
et al., 2008, for supporting anatomo-functional description) is
characterizedby important“intrinsic”activity during resting states
(Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle, 2006; Raichle and Snyder, 2007). It
is noteworthy that this activity is especially evidenced in experi-
ments in which subjects are explicitly instructed to “refrain from
moving and reacting” in passive viewing conditions (Mazoyer
et al., 2001). The meaning of these resting state activations is
still controversial. By providing behavioral evidence that proactive
inhibition of response is the default mode of executive control,
the present data strongly support our former suggestion that
the activity at rest may be partly due to an active and sustained
process consisting of locking movement initiation mechanisms.
Nevertheless, understanding the intrinsic brain activity preced-
ing stimulation is still a challenge of critical importance, and
a large amount of work is still needed to understand precisely
how proactive inhibitory control works. We hope that the ﬁnd-
ings described in this paper will suggest theoretical and method-
ological lines of inquiry that will contribute to achieving this
goal.
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